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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1641 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRYAN HILL,  
a/k/a “B”, a/k/a BASHIR 
 
     Bryan Hill, 
                     Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 10-cr-00620-07) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2015 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 11, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Bryan Hill appeals his conviction and sentence in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on his participation in a large-scale drug-
trafficking enterprise known as the “Harlem Boys” that operated in the Bartram Village 
Housing Development (“Bartram Village”) in Philadelphia.  On appeal, he raises three 
grounds of alleged error.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.    
I. Background 
 The pertinent factual background surrounding the Harlem Boys drug-trafficking 
operation is set forth more fully in the lead opinion in the case.  See United States v. 
Moten, No. 13-3801, Slip Op. at 2-5 (3d Cir. May 11, 2015).  We provide here only the 
facts relevant to Hill’s appeal. 
 Stemming from his participation in the Harlem Boys enterprise, Hill was named 
along with nineteen other defendants in an eighty-nine count superseding indictment.  
More specifically, he was charged with conspiracy to participate in a racketeering 
enterprise (count 1), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); conspiracy to distribute 280 
grams of cocaine base (crack) and marijuana (count 2), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(b)(1)(A) and 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) (count 7), 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); use of a communication facility in 
furtherance of a drug crime (count 18), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon (count 31), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He 
was convicted of all five counts and the District Court sentenced him to 240 months’ 
 3 
 
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release and imposed various fines and special 
assessments.   
II. Discussion1  
 On appeal, Hill challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, argues 
that the District Court incorrectly calculated his offense level, and contends that the Court 
imposed an unreasonable sentence in light of the time he had already served.   
 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence2 
 According to Hill, there was insufficient evidence to show that he was a part of the 
Harlem Boys enterprise rather than merely a seller to – and occasional buyer from – the 
enterprise.  He argues that his conviction on counts 1 and 2 should therefore be vacated.  
We disagree. 
 Hill correctly cites to United States v. Gibbs for the proposition that a “simple 
buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond 
the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer was a member of the 
seller’s conspiracy.”  190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  That is not, however, the case 
here.  Rather, the government adduced substantial evidence that Hill was an integral 
member of the Harlem Boys enterprise.  For example, the evidence showed that he 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 2 “[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
criminal conviction ... is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational  trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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obtained drugs for the Harlem Boys to sell on the streets of Bartram Village; he returned 
a portion of his profits from those sales to one of the Harlem Boys; he was observed on 
numerous occasions selling crack while standing next to – and in one instance physically 
receiving objects from – the members of the Harlem Boys; and he was well-known as 
one of the Harlem Boys’ “goons” – that is, someone who would “rob or shoot people, kill 
people” on behalf of the enterprise.  (App. at 6644.)  The government also adduced 
testimony that Hill participated in a carjacking along with members of the enterprise in 
retaliation for an assault on a cousin of one of the Harlem Boys.  Finally, Hill has 
tattooed on his right forearm the letters “YHM,” an acronym for “Young Hit Men,” 
which was an alternative name for the Harlem Boys.  (App. at 1390.)  See Moten, No. 13-
3801, Slip Op. at 1.  Given those facts, a rational juror could certainly conclude that Hill 
was part of the criminal enterprise.   
 B. Incorrect Offense Level3 
 Hill next argues that the District Court incorrectly calculated his base offense level 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Again, he is mistaken.  
 The District Court calculated Hill’s base offense level using the quantity of crack 
the enterprise was distributing during the time period when Hill was part of the enterprise 
and not incarcerated.  The Court concluded that the entire weekly quantity of crack that 
the Harlem Boys distributed was attributable to Hill – some 4.5 ounces – but only for the 
weeks when he was participating in the enterprise – some 197 weeks.  The District Court 
                                              
 3 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines and review its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. 
Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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calculated that quantity to be more than 24 kilograms, which was the quantity used to 
determine the offense level of 38. 
 That conclusion depended upon the premise that Hill was not merely a street-level 
dealer for the enterprise but rather was an active and substantial participant in its 
operations and thus responsible for more of the crack than he was personally dealing.  We 
cannot see any error, let alone clear error, in that factual finding.  See United States v. 
Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 118 (3d Cir. 2014) (factual findings at sentencing are reviewed for 
clear error).  Based on that finding, the District Court could attribute to Hill the entire 
quantity of drugs that it was reasonably foreseeable the enterprise would sell.  United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[W]hether a particular defendant 
may be held accountable for amounts of drugs involved in transactions conducted by a 
co-conspirator depends upon the degree of the defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy 
and, of course, reasonable foreseeability with respect to the conduct of others within the 
conspiracy.”). 
 C. Unreasonable Sentence4  
 Finally, Hill argues that his sentence of 240 months’ incarceration was 
substantively unreasonable because of the “irrational” sentencing disparity between crack 
and powder cocaine, his lower degree of involvement in the enterprise, his previous 
periods of incarceration for related offenses, more lenient sentences given to culpable 
                                              
 4 We review a District Court’s sentence for substantive reasonableness under an 
abuse of discretion standard that takes into account the totality of the circumstances.  Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  
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cooperators, and various socioeconomic disadvantages that he faced as a child.  (Opening 
Br. at 48.)  His arguments are unpersuasive.   
 First, because Hill was sentenced after the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, which reduced the crack to powder ratio from 100:1 to 18:1, the District Court was 
merely permitted – but not obligated – to vary downward based on the lower powder 
Guidelines.5  Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009).  Any policy 
disagreement Hill has with respect to the remaining sentencing disparity between crack 
and powder cocaine must be directed to Congress.  Second, the District Court based its 
sentence on Hill’s role in the enterprise, which it found to be substantial and active, albeit 
not one of leadership.  (App. at 8930 (“[T]his is somebody who is deeply involved in the 
regular, ongoing, dangerous criminal behavior which took place during the life of the 
                                              
 5 In his sentencing memorandum – but not at the hearing itself – Hill moved for a 
discretionary downward variance based on the sentencing disparity between crack and 
powder cocaine offenses.  The District Court did not expressly rule on that request.  In at 
least one circuit, the failure to expressly address a downward variance request based on 
the powder to crack disparity can be reversible error.  See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 
775 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Although it is true that the court granted [the 
defendant] a below-guidelines sentence, it is impossible to discern from this record 
whether the court credited [his] … argument[] [as to the crack-powder disparity] in 
fashioning that sentence and so we must remand.”); United States v. Johnson, 643 F.3d 
545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Johnson argues that the district court committed a procedural 
error at resentencing by not expressly responding to his repeated requests for a 1:1 crack-
to-powder ratio. … We agree with Johnson that the district court erred.”).  While we have 
remanded cases decided prior to Spears on that basis, we have not done so after.  Because 
Hill does not argue that the District Court committed a procedural error, we only note that 
the better course would have been to explicitly address Hill’s major arguments for 
variance. 
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conspiracy.”).)  That factual finding was not clearly erroneous and the below-Guidelines 
sentence the Court imposed based on that finding was not an abuse of discretion.   
 Third, the District Court actually did consider Hill’s previous periods of 
incarceration and granted a substantial downward variance – somewhere around five 
years – based on the state sentences that Hill served for the predicate acts charged in the 
RICO conspiracy.  Fourth, the District Court also granted an additional downward 
variance – somewhere around five years – based on the sentencing disparities between 
Hill and the leaders of the enterprise who received lighter sentences because they pled 
guilty.  We cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the Court not to grant a larger 
downward variance.  Finally, the District Court did consider the unfortunate 
circumstances of Hill’s upbringing but ultimately chose not to grant an additional 
downward variance on that basis.  That was not an abuse of discretion.   
III. Conclusion 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm Hill’s conviction and sentence.  
